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Paul Samuelson (1948, p. 484; 1967, p. 426) was fond of pointing out that 
the “privilege of being able to buy a vast array of goods at low prices cannot be 
overestimated.”  Michael Cox and Richard Alm (1998) showed that U.S. 
consumers enjoy 790 different magazines, 285 styles of running shoes, 340 
different breakfast cereals, 185 various television channels, 1212 models of 
vehicles and more—in large part owing to the vast expansion of variety brought 
by globalization.  It is difficult to imagine that these customers would have been 
only marginally better off had they all just driven a white Chevrolet, ate 
Wheaties, read Business Week, and watched the Public Broadcasting System.  It 
is here that the theory of monopolistic competition becomes exceedingly useful: to 
get a handle on the value of variety. 
In a constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) utility function, the smaller is 
the elasticity the higher is the value placed on variety.  The empirical aspects of 
estimating elasticities of substitution have been brought out in papers by Robert 
Feenstra (1994), Mark Bils and Peter Klenow (2001), Christian Broda and David 
Weinstein (2006), and Feenstra and Hiau Kee (2008), among others.  Broda and 
Weinstein (2006) estimated that the increase in the number of available varieties 
due to international trade from 1972 to 2001 was valued by U.S. consumers at 
2.6 percent of their real income.  Other researchers have found larger estimates of 
the gains from variety.   
  2We do not here try to improve on these estimates.  Rather, by a more 
faithful quantitative representation of the simplest model, we try to make more 
evident how economies of scale and elasticities of substitution fit into the 
standard model of monopolistic competition. 
It will be recalled that there are two approaches to monopolistic 
competition: the love-of-variety approach (Avinash Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz, 
1977; Paul Krugman, 1981) that approximates the solution with an elasticity of 
demand equal to the constant elasticity of substitution; and the Kelvin Lancaster 
(1980) approach with heterogeneous consumers, each of whom had a single most-
preferred variety.  The Lancaster approach had the nice feature that it generated 
higher demand elasticities with a larger market, because each consumer would be 
closer to her most-preferred variety. However, it is very difficult to analyze 
(Elhanan Helpman and Krugman, 1985).  Thus, we present a fresh analysis of the 
Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman (DSK) model of monopolistic competition in which the 
elasticity of demand facing each firm is endogenous.  DSK and others have used 
the approximation that the number of varieties does not affect the elasticity of 
demand facing each firm.  We use the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium concept to have 
a two-way street between the number of varieties and the elasticity of demand in 
comparing equilibrium outcomes.  The model is almost as simple as the DSK 
approximation, but allows us to focus on the role of economies of scale. 
  3Recent work by Catia Montagna (2001), Marc Melitz (2003) and Feenstra 
and Kee (2008) emphasizes the importance of firm heterogeneity in determining 
the impact of globalization on productivity.  Their set up is distinguished by a 
continuum of firms wherein the elasticity of demand facing each firm equals the 
elasticity of substitution.  In their work, globalization causes the exit of lower 
productivity firms, resulting in an increase in aggregate productivity.  This 
approach, however, abstracts from one possible feature whereby globalization can 
affect welfare—through the exploitation of economies of scale made possible by 
larger markets. 
Economies of scale are a two-edged sword.  The greater are the economies of 
scale, the fewer are the number of varieties and the larger is the gain in 
productivity from globalization; the smaller are the economies of scale, the 
greater is variety and the smaller is the gain in productivity.  By having a model 
with variable demand elasticities this tension is nicely captured.  We will return 
to this theme in the sequel. 
We look at three theoretical questions: (1) What are the relative roles of 
variety and per capita output in determining per capita utility? (2) What are the 
productivity gains from globalization due to economies of scale? (3) How great of 
a departure from social efficiency prevails in a world of free entry and variety?  
We show that by dropping the approximation that DSK and others have used it 
is possible to give interesting answers to the above questions.  For example, to 
  4estimate per capita utility it is only necessary to look at per capita incomes in 
each sector, the relative importance of each sector, and estimates of the 
substitution parameter in that sector.  Broda and Weinstein (2006) use U.S. 
import shares; but the model itself suggests that the appropriate weights are 
GDP shares. 
Section II presents the analysis of demand, which simply reprises the work 
of Helpman and Krugman (1985, pp. 117-120), who oddly do not apply the 
analysis to the model.  Section II also presents a new graphical analysis of the 
model of monopolistic competition that parallels Krugman’s pioneering 
treatment.  Section III then solves for the exact solutions to the relevant 
variables and shows that the ratio of real income to measured per capita GDP 
increases with the size of the economy and the preference for variety.  The result 
easily generalizes to an economy with many sectors.  Section III also shows that 
per capita consumption of each variety still falls as the population rises and more 
varieties are introduced.  This result had to hold in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and 
Krugman (1981) because their approximation required a constant output for each 
firm.  Section IV looks at the issue of globalization, and shows how international 
trade increases real income faster than measured GDP, depending on the relative 
size of the economy and, once again, the preference for variety.  We find that the 
simple DSK model used here likely gives a gain from trade that is an order of 
magnitude too large, suggesting that modifications must be made for deeper 
  5applications. The DSK approximation that the size of each firm is negligible 
compromises the question of the socially efficient number of firms.  We agree 
with the spirit of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) that excessive entry is not a problem, 
but their claim that the market equilibrium is characterized by insufficient entry 
is not supported by our analysis.
1  We show that under the assumption of a CES 
utility function, the socially optimal number of firms falls short of the market 
equilibrium but only by a fraction that measures the substitutability of the 
different varieties—so it is essentially a non-issue. This analysis is presented in 
Section V. 
 
II. The model 
  Let there be a homogeneous population of L agents, each with the same 
symmetric utility function over n varieties of some differentiated good, such as 
the automobile or cereal industries.  Each variety of the good is produced by the 
same production function, l = α + βx, where l and x and labor input and output 
respectively for fixed (α) and variable costs (βx). Labor is completely mobile 
between varieties.  We let labor be the numeraire, so the wage w = 1.  Each 




θ θ =Σ , with θ between 0 and 1.  Thus, every variety faces 
the same demand and same costs. The elasticity of substitution is σ = 1/(1-θ), 
                                                 
1 Mankiw and Whinston (1986) showed that in a Cournot model with free entry there is excessive entry, but 
the analysis was qualitative rather than quantitative. 
  6and so must always exceed unity.  The parameter θ is an inverse measure of the 



















where income is unity and pj is the price of each variety.  Since the term (1-θ)/θ 
appears in so many equations, we shall call it our measure of the preference for 
variety.  We assume that the i
th firm considers all other prices fixed, as in 
Bertrand.  The firm would thus calculate the numerical value of the elasticity of 














.         ( 1 )  
  There is no necessity to assume that n is so large that  , as in Dixit 
and Stiglitz (1977), Krugman (1981) or Dixit and Victor Norman (1980).  With 
equal costs and equal demands, in a symmetrical Nash equilibrium all prices will 
be pi = p, so in that equilibrium the elasticity of demand facing each firm will 
simply be: 









.          ( 2 )  
Clearly, ∂ε/∂n = (σ-1)/n
2.  It is important to stress that (2) does not depend on 
any approximations, but only on the Bertrand-Nash assumption and the equality 
of all prices in equilibrium.  This result was noted in Helpman and Krugman 
(1985, p. 119), but their analysis assumes that ε = σ.  For monopolistic 
  7competition, we must assume σ > 1 in order to obtain the intuitive result that 
the elasticity of demand facing each firm increases as more varieties are added.  
The explanation is that while increasing the number of varieties lowers the 
income effect of a price change, this is more than offset by a relatively large 
substitution effect when σ > 1.  Note that the firm will believe, from (1), that  
∂εi/∂pi > 0.  However, in comparing symmetrical Nash equilibria, it is only 
necessary to examine (2), where ∂ε/∂p = 0.  Between Nash equilibria all prices 
rise or fall and so the elasticity of demand depends only on the number of 
varieties.   
There is free entry of new varieties, each of which enters the utility function 
in precisely the same way.  In the free-entry equilibrium, ignoring the integer 
problem, the price of every variety must be the same and equal to its cost of 
production.  The Nash solution for the model then consists of three equations:  
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        ( 3 )  
  p x
α β =+           ( 4 )  
  .          ( 5 )   ( Ln x αβ =+ )
The profit-maximization equation (3) has been written in two ways: the first way 
is the familiar one; the second way is critical to our formulation and takes 
  8account of (2) and the definition σ =1/(1-θ).
2  Equation (4) is the free entry 
condition, and equation (5) is full employment.   
  We make two observations.  First, if one makes the DSK approximation, 
the elasticity of demand ε is a constant and so the price of each variety, p, is 
fixed.  It follows from (4) that output, x, of each variety is also fixed, so that as 
the population increases, per capita consumption of each variety must fall.  In 
the more general case we present here, when the population rises, the number of 
varieties rises, which increases the elasticity of demand and drops the price, so 
output must rise, but not by as much as the population, so that per capita 
consumption again falls. 
  The second observation is that the equations may be easily generalized to 
any number of industries just by indexing the variables.  Krugman (1981) builds 
on this observation to use the model to explain the volume of intra-industry 
trade.  We later show how the observation affects the measurement of real 
income. 
We can now offer a more accurate graphical presentation of the model than 
that found in Krugman (1979).  In Figure 1, the curve PP shows the “price” 
equation (3).  It is downward-sloping because with more varieties, individual 
firms face more competition from substitutes and must lower their price to 
                                                 
2 Note from (3) that as n goes to infinity, the price goes to β/θ instead of just β in contrast to Cournot 
oligopoly.  Roy Ruffin (1971) shows that in the Cournot case, with a U-shaped cost curve, an exogenous 
increase in the number of firms (if viable) results in price approaching marginal cost, but for an endogenous 
increase  (with free entry) due to a larger market price approaches minimum average cost.   
  9maximize profits.  Equations (4) and (5) can be collapsed into a single equation 
by eliminating x so that average cost is a function of the size of the labor force 









+ .          ( 6 )  
Thus, an increase in the number varieties, n, must cause the price, or average 
costs, to rise.  In Figure 1, this “cost” equation (6) is labeled CC.  Intuitively, 
this is easy to understand because from (5) we can see that for a constant L, an 
increase in n must depress x, the output of each firm, to maintain full 
employment; but if x falls, due to economies of scale, equation (4) tells us that p 
or average costs will rise. 
  An increase in L shifts the CC curve to the right and, thus, increases n and 
lowers p.  Thus, since p falls, it must be that the output of each commodity, x, 
rises. This representation is consistent with the usual monopolistic competition 
story that an increase in the population moves the economy down each average 
cost curve, as noted above. 
  The effect of globalization is shown by assuming that there is a foreign 
country (indicated by an *) facing the same costs and with the same demand.  In 
Figure 1, we assume that L* > L, so that the cost equation for the foreign 
country is shifted to the right but with the same price equation.  The world 
economy is indicated by the C
oC
o curve reflecting the even higher world labor 
  10supply of L* + L = L
o.  Clearly, free trade benefits the smaller “home” country 
more than the larger foreign country. 
 
III.  Quantitative analysis 
  It is not necessary to analyze equations (3)-(5) by the standard comparative 
statics because we can solve for x, n, and p.
3  These will be critical in answering 
the questions with which we started this paper.  To proceed, equation (5) can be 
substituted into (4) to eliminate x, and then (4) can be equated to (3) to solve for 
n.  In turn, we can solve for the reduced form solutions:  
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.         ( 9 )  
Notice that the term (L –α) appears in two of these equations.  The 
interpretation is that for the model to make any sense, the labor supply of the 
economy must exceed the fixed cost of producing a single variety.   
From the standpoint of international trade theory, equation (9) is the most 
interesting.  It shows that the fall in the price of the product as the labor supply 
increases is fairly gradual because ∂[L/(L-α)]/∂L = -α/(L-α)
2, but is 
proportional to the magnitude of marginal costs relative to the inverse preference 
 
3 For completeness, differentiating (3)-(5) yields: ∂p/∂L = -ε’(p-β)/∆, ∂x/∂L=  xε’/∆, and ∂n/∂L =  (ε-1)/∆L, 
where  ∆= [(ε-1)L/n + ε’nβx]  > 0.  
  11for variety, θ.  This gives us an explanation of the evolution of comparative 
advantage between economies with high and low marginal costs.  Economies 
producing lots of different goods with low marginal costs will find that being 
larger does not lower their prices as much as economies with high marginal costs.  
Population growth in the United States might lower prices less than population 
growth in, say, India or China.  Thus, faster growth can shift comparative 
advantage in differentiated products in favor of such countries. 
Since it is the ratio β/θ that matters, we can see that the preference for 
variety (a low θ) also plays a role in determining the course of comparative 
advantage.  It is difficult to solve the model with differences in technology, 
however, and we leave this matter aside for future work. 
 Per  capita  consumption of each variety is c =x/L.  It is convenient to define 









.          ( 1 0 )  
It is clear that as L increases, per capita consumption of each variety falls.  This 
is a prediction of the model.  Recall that Krugman (1979) obtained this result by 
assuming that the elasticity of demand rises with smaller consumption.  This was 
necessary because a greater population had to lead firms to lower their price as 
they faced a higher price elasticity of demand.  However, we now have derived 
this result as a testable prediction rather than an assumption. 
  12The quantity xn is “real” GDP.  GDP is pxn =(α/x + β)xn = n(α + βx) = L 







== .          ( 1 1 )  
From the utility function, the utility of each consumer is 
1
un c θ = .  Per capita 









                                                
.           ( 1 2 )  
Equation (12) shows that u/y is increasing in the labor supply, since A = L(1-θ) 
+ αθ.  The larger an economy, the greater is the departure of the measurement of 
real income from the measurement of per capita real GDP.  In other words, GDP 
was a better measure of well-being in the year 1900 than in 2000!  Note that A/α 
is raised to the power(1 , which is a good measure of the preference for 
variety.  As the preference for variety increases, the coefficient of per capita 
income rises; as the preference for variety vanishes (θ = 1), utility equals per 
capita income.  From the definition of A, and noting equation (8), the ratio A/α 
is simply the number of varieties.   
)/ θθ −
  It is not necessary to assume a single good with different varieties.  Assume 
now many industries with labor perfectly mobile between industries as well as 
varieties.
4  Recall our observation that the basic equations are the same for each 
industry.  If we make the assumption that the overall utility function is Cobb-
Douglas in the sub-utility functions given by the CES utility functions, with 
 
4 Krugman (1981) assumes labor cannot move between industries, but can between varieties. 
  13possibly different θs, it is easy to generalize (12) for any number of industries 
with per capita income measured for each industry.  The natural log of such a 
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,       ( 1 3 )  
where γi is the share spent on good i, θi is the preference parameter for varieties 
of the i
th good, and Ai = Li(1-θi) + αiθi.  Note that yi is now per capita income in 
sector i measured in terms of good i, or yi = θi(γiL-α)/βiγiL, using (11) and Li 
=γiL. 
This equation tells us the following.
5  Even in a world of no measurement 
problems with completely homogeneous labor, the real income (utility) of a 
community cannot be measured without looking at (1) the share spent on each 
industry, (2) the desire for variety in each industry, (3) the resources devoted to 
each industry relative to fixed costs, and (4) the per capita output of each 
industry.  In other words, a measure such as GDP covers up a lot of sins, and 
“micro” data are necessary to yield macro answers.  This finding, of course, 
follows from our very simple model; but presumably in a more complicated 
model, the situation might even be worse. 
 
5 How equation (13) would be modified by the production structure in which the increased variety of inputs 
expands the output of a homogeneous good is an interesting question we have not pursued (see Wilfred J. 
Ethier, 1982). 
  14Consider a back-of-the-envelope calculation of the gains from variety.  
Suppose, for example, that there are but two sectors of the economy.  Sector 1 
has a σ1 = ∞.  Thus: 
 
2
11 2 2 2
2
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. 
The middle term captures the impact of variety.  Suppose, along with Broda and 
Weinstein (2006) that we assume the median elasticity of substitution is 2.7.  
Since (1-θ)/θ = 1/(σ-1) = 1/1.7 = .59.  If γ2 = .5, so half of all goods are variety 
goods, then a 1 percent rate of growth in variety per year (Bils and Klenow, 
2001) would increase real income by .5(.59) =.3 percent per year.  Triple the rate 
of growth in variety and the contribution of variety to real income growth would 
be to add about 1 percent per year to the rate of growth in real income.  Cox and 
Alm (1998) showed that in consumer packaged goods alone, producers introduced 
24,965 new goods in 1998, up from just 4,414 in 1980.
6  Thus, it is very critical to 
get more accurate estimates of the relevant parameters. 
 
IV. Globalization 
Let us now return to the single sector case and consider what happens when 
you have globalization.  We have just seen that the growth of variety may on an 
annual basis raise real income modestly but perhaps very significantly.  In 
standard trade theory, the movement from autarky to free trade has a very 
 
6 Retailers code and track new product introductions in terms of shelf-keeping units (SKUs).  While surely 
many new product introductions fail, many also remain—if consumers want them.  
  15modest effect on real income.  What happens in the case of the DSK model?  We 
show that this effect is far from modest.   
  With free trade, identical technologies, identical preferences, and zero costs 
of transferring goods, the world economy works like one large economy.  In 
Figure 1, the cost curve for the world economy is C
oC
o, which lies to the right of 
the foreign C*C*.  The equation the world cost curve C
oC
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The joint number of varieties is now (n + n*).  We can see in Figure 1 but also 
by general reasoning that the free trade level of output for each firm, x
o will 
exceed the autarkic levels, x and x* simply because the price of the product is 
smaller.  Since it is still true that L = n(α+βx), the larger output means the 
number of varieties each country produces in free trade must fall short of the 
number of varieties produced under autarky.  Note that with free entry and exit 
which varieties are produced by which country cannot be determined.  To the 
extent that comparative advantage is not involved, the pattern of trade is 
indeterminate.  When economies of scale are involved, who exports what can be 
determined by the accident of history.   
  In our free trade world every consumer has the same real income and 
consumption of each variety.  Letting L
o = L + L* and A
o = L
o(1-θ) + αθ, all the 
solutions (7), (8), (9), (11), and (12) are exactly the same, but with L
o and A
o 




Accordingly, the ratio of per capita income in free trade to per capita income in 
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But any reasonable estimate of α/L or α/L
o need not be very small.  It 
would be similar to the ratio of fixed costs of an average business firm to the size 
of the industry.  For example:  About $100 billion of value-added is in the U.S. 
automobile industry; GM annual sales are about $180 billion, so it is reasonable 
to suppose fixed costs in the neighborhood of $30 billion.  Thus, provisionally, 
assume α/L is 0.3 while α/L
o is 0.1.  Then the ratio would be z = .9/.7 = 1.28—
not an unreasonable estimate.  Accordingly, the gain in productivity for each 
firm or industry due to economies of scale should be significant.  Of course, we 
must remember we are here considering a move from autarky to free trade, not a 
movement toward more trade such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement.  Nonetheless, the fact that it has been difficult to observe the gains 
from trade due to economies of scale (Daniel Trefler, 2004, p. 887; Kieth Head 
and John Ries, 1999) should be regarded as a puzzle to be sorted out.   
Using (12), the ratio of free trade utility to autarky utility is: 
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= y .          (15) 
This shows that the increase in utility could be a substantial multiple of the 
increase in per capita income.  For example, if the home country was only 10% of 
the world, A
o/A ≈ 10 and if θ = .4 the proportionate increase in utility would be 
more than ten times the proportionate increase in per capita income.  But as the 
inverse measure of the preference for variety goes to 1, the gains from trade 
simply reflects the change in per capita income.  This seems to be an order of 
magnitude too large for the gains from trade, and the explanation would 
undoubtedly involve a higher θ and taking into account trade costs and the 
relative importance of intra-industry trade. But it does suggest that better 
estimates of θ might be useful.  Notice that the effect of the increase in variety 
brought about by globalization may be much larger than any impact on 
productivity in this world without comparative advantages.   
  Equation (15) captures the tension between economies of scale and the 
number of varieties.  The greater are the economies of scale, the smaller is A
o/A 
and the larger is y
o/y.   
  This tension is of course absent in the approximation used by Dixit and 
Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1981).  When one sets  , then the 
solutions to (3)-(5) are easy: 
1/(1 ) εσ θ == −
  p β
θ =          (16) 
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Now per capita income is a constant, θ/β, so any changes in the labor supply or 
trade cannot change p, per capita income, or x. All that happens is that the 










V.  Social efficiency 
  We now want to show that the degree of economies of scale does not appear 
to be significant in determining the social efficiency of the market equilibrium.  
The socially efficient number of firms is formed by maximizing: 
  [
1
( Hn c L n x θ λα β =+−+ ] ) .        (20) 
In other words, we are maximizing per capita utility subject to the resource 
constraint. Since c = x/L, we can rewrite (20) as: 
  [
1
( () x Hn L n x L
θ λα β =+ − + ] ) .        (21) 
The function n
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− ∂ = ∂ −=        (22) 







=         (23) 
  () 0 H Ln x αβ λ
∂ =− + ∂ = .         (24) 
Fortunately, we can eliminate 
1









= .          (25) 
But from (8) it is clear that the private equilibrium is n = n
opt + θ.  The social 
optimum falls short of the private equilibrium by just a fraction, θ, and, thus, 
social efficiency holds approximately in the private equilibrium.  The reason 
economies of scale do not matter in the question is that such economies affect 




This paper explores the implications of allowing the number of varieties in 
the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model of monopolistic competition to affect the 
elasticity of demand facing each firm.  While the difference between the elasticity 
of substitution and the elasticity of demand may be slight, the results show that: 
1.  The utility of each person depends on not only the amount of variety, but 
on the per capita income or efficiency of the economy.  In a multi-sector 
set-up, utility per capita reflects the elasticity of substitution in each 
  20sector, the share of income devoted to each sector, and the value-added of 
each sector.  This gives one a different view of real income than a simple 
GDP calculation. 
2.  Abstracting from comparative advantage, the gains from globalization can 
be divided into the gain from variety and the gain from economies of scale.  
There is, however, a tension between them because greater economies of 
scale reduce the gains from variety.  The gains from the latter appear to 
be larger. 
3.  An interesting extension might be to show the relative importance of 
economies of scale and differences in productivity among domestic and 
exporting firms (Melitz, 2003; Feenstra and Kee, 2008).  How to do this 
remains a puzzle because a continuum of firms simplifies the model but 
necessarily abstracts from economies of scale. 
4.  Free entry does not result in significant socially inefficient entry.  This is 
because economies of scale equally affect the market equilibrium number 
of firms and the socially efficient number. 
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